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Game Theoretic Approach to the Stabilization of Heterogeneous
Multiagent Systems Using Subsidy
Takuya Morimoto, Takafumi Kanazawa, and Toshimitsu Ushio
Abstract— We consider a multiagent system consisting of
selfish and heterogeneous agents. Its behavior is modeled by
multipopulation replicator dynamics, where payoff functions of
populations are different from each other. In general, there
exist several equilibrium points in the replicator dynamics. In
order to stabilize a desirable equilibrium point, we introduce a
controller called a “government” which controls the behaviors
of agents by offering them subsidies. In previous work, it is
assumed that the government determines the subsidies based
on the populations the agents belong to. In general, however, the
government cannot identify the members of each population.
In this paper, we assume that the government observes the
action of each agent and determines the subsidies based on the
observed action profile. Then, we model the controlled behav-
iors of the agents using replicator dynamics with feedback. We
derive a stabilization condition of the target equilibrium point
in the replicator dynamics.
I. Introduction
Multiagent systems consist of a large number of agents
interacting with each other. They offer an innovative way to
manage large-scale, dynamic, and heterogeneous computing
systems [1]. The internet and multi-database systems are
examples of such systems [2]. The agents act selfishly so
as to improve their own payoffs, which may be mutually
different. In this paper, such a multiagent system is said to
be heterogeneous. The agents are grouped into several popu-
lations and their payoff functions are same if they belong to
the same population. Figure 1 illustrates the heterogeneous
multiagent system. We model the systems by multipopulation
replicator dynamics [3].
In general, there exist several equilibrium points in the
replicator dynamics. However, the desirable equilibrium
point is not always stable. For example, consider a situation
where a multiagent system consists of a single population
and two agents are repeatedly selected at random from the
population to play a 2-player Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
All agents select “defect” or “cooperate”, and change their
actions based on their earned payoffs. In this case, there
exist two equilibrium points: all agents select “defect”, or all
agents select “cooperate”. The former is stable but undesir-
able, while the latter is unstable but desirable, since the latter
earns a larger payoff than the former. Such a phenomenon
is called a social dilemma and many approaches have been
taken to resolve the dilemma [4]. Similar phenomena occur
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in the heterogeneous multiagent system. Thus, stabilization
of an unstable but desirable equilibrium point in multiagent
systems is an important issue.
An approach to the stabilization problem is to improve
agent’s learning algorithm. Stimpson and Goodrich provide a
satisficing algorithm which reaches a Pareto efficient solution
in self-play, and avoids exploitation by selfish agents [5].
Moreover, the mechanism design is an effective method of
solving the social dilemma [6]. The mechanism design is a
theory to design the rules to achieve the desirable state in
the case that the agents act selfishly [7].
In this paper, we introduce a controller called a “gov-
ernment” that stabilizes a desirable equilibrium point of
the multiagent systems by offering the subsidies to agents.
Kanazawa et al. consider a desirable equilibrium point as
a target equilibrium point, and derive a condition of the
amount of the subsidy for the target equilibrium point to be
asymptotically stable in a homogeneous case [8], and Ichiba
et al. derive a condition in a heterogeneous case [9]. In the
previous work [9], it is assumed that the government knows
which population each agent belongs to and determines the
subsidies for agents based on both their populations and their
actions in order to stabilize a target equilibrium point. How-
ever, the government cannot always identify the members
of each population. Thus, we consider that the government
determines the subsidies based on the observation of agents’
actions. A stabilization condition for a target equilibrium
point based on such a control action has been shown in 2-
population and 2-action replicator dynamics [10].
In this paper, we extend the condition to m-population
and n-action replicator dynamics (m ≥ 2, n ≥ 2). Figure
2 illustrates how the government controls agents. We as-
sume that all agents have the same set of actions. Agents
who belong to the same population have the same payoff
functions depending on the populations. We assume that the
government cannot identify the members of each population
but can observe agents’ actions (we call it an output). The
government chooses a target output and offers the subsidies
which depend on the output to achieve the target output.
As a result, we consider a stabilization problem of a target
equilibrium point which corresponds to the target output.
Since the feedback action of the government is based on the
output, we derive replicator dynamics based on the feedback.
Then, we propose a control law for determining the subsidy
for each agent, and show a sufficient condition for the global
stabilization of the target output.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review
the multipopulation replicator dynamics, which describes the
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the heterogeneous multiagent system.
behaviors of heterogeneous multiagent systems. In Section 3,
we introduce a government that controls multiagent systems
based on the observation of agents’ actions, and derive a
model to represent the behaviors of the controlled systems.
In Section 4, we derive a stabilization condition of the target
equilibrium point and show a numerical example.
II. Multipopulation replicator dynamics
Let us review a game theoretic model of the interaction
among agents in multiple populations. We consider multiple
populations that consist of a large number of agents. We
assume that agents who belong to the same population have
the same sense of values or the same criterion, while agents
who belong to different populations have different ones.
Since the sense of values or the criterion of each agent is
represented as a payoff function, agents who belong to the
same population have the same payoff function depending on
the population. We also assume that, in a sufficiently long
period of time, agents’ senses of values or criteria do not
change. All agents do not move among the populations, that
is, the number of agents in each population is constant. We
assume that all agents have the same set of actions. Two
agents are repeatedly selected at random from all populations
to play a 2-player game. They may belong to the same
population. Agents change their actions depending on the
payoffs earned in the game. Agents do not know which
population their opponents belong to. In this paper, we use
the following notations:
• P = {1, . . . ,m}: the set of populations;
• S = {1, . . . , n}: the set of actions;
• xki ∈R(i∈S , k∈P, 0≤xki≤1): a share of action i in popula-
tion k;
• ∆ =
{
(z1, . . . , zn)T∈Rn | ∑ j∈S z j = 1, zi≥0 ∀i∈S }: the set
of combinations of shares of actions in a population;
• xk = (xk1, . . . , xkn)T∈∆: a combination of shares of actions
in population k;
• x =
(
(x1)T , . . . , (xm)T
)T
∈∆m: a combination of xk;
• ei∈∆(i∈S ): the unit vector corresponding to action i;
• vk(k∈P, 0 < vk < 1): a share of agents who belong to
population k;
• yi =
∑
k∈Pv
k xki (0≤yi≤1): a total share of action i in all
populations;
• y = (y1, . . . , yn)T∈∆: a profile of the total share of each
action in all populations;
• int(∆m): the interior of ∆m;
• C(y) = {i∈S | yi > 0}: the carrier of y∈∆;
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Fig. 2. Illustration of controlled multiagent system by government.
• Ak∈Rn×n: the payoff matrix of the population k;
• aki j: the i j-th element of the payoff matrix Ak; and
• uk(ei, e j) = eTi Ake j: the payoff of agents with action i∈S
against j∈S .
We introduce a government that controls the multiagent
system by observing a share of agents using each action
not in each population, but in all populations. We call
xk a population state of population k, and y an output.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the population state
combination x and the corresponding output y.
In Ref. [9], it is assumed that each agent’s payoff depends
on which population his opponent belongs to. However,
in this paper, we assume that each agent’s payoff does
not depend on this. Since an agent plays a game with
an opponent who selects action i with probability yi, the
expected value of a payoff for an agent with action i in
population k is
∑
j∈S
y juk(ei, e j) = uk(ei, y).
The average payoff of all agents in the population k is
∑
i∈S
xki u
k(ei, y) = uk(xk, y).
We assume that agents change their actions to obtain a higher
payoff after the game. Also, we suppose that the increase
rate of the share of action i is proportional to the difference
between the payoff which is earned with action i and the
average payoff in the population. Therefore, the replicator
dynamics is given by the following differential equation:
x˙ki =
{
uk(ei, y) − uk(xk, y)
}
xki , (1)
for all i∈S and k∈P. Equation (1) satisfies the following
proposition:
Proposition 1: Equation (1) is invariant under any local
shift of the payoff matrix Ak for all k∈P, where the local
shift is the addition of a constant to all elements of a column
of payoff matrix Ak.
See Appendix A-1 for a proof of Proposition 1.
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Fig. 3. The relationship between the population state combination x and
the corresponding output y.
III. The introduction of subsidy
We introduce a government that controls the multiagent
system by the subsidy. We assume that the government
observes the output y corresponding to the population state
combination x.
Let y∗ = (y∗1, . . . , y∗n)T be a target output of the government.
Let pi be the number of agents that select action i, and p =∑
i∈S pi be the total number of agents of all populations. In
this paper, the government determines the assignment of a
subsidy to each agent based on the total amount of subsidies
D, the target output y∗, and the current output y. We assume
that, if y∗i = 0, then the subsidy to a group of agents with
action i is 0. If y∗i > 0, the government offers subsidy Dy∗i
to a group of agents with action i, and equally distributes
the subsidy among all agents in the group. Let d > 0 be an
average subsidy per agent. Note that d is independent of the
output y and the population state combination x. Then, the
total amount of subsidies is D = dp. We assume that pi > 0
for all i∈S . Thus, an agent with action i obtains the subsidy
(Dy∗i )/pi = (dpy∗i )/pi = (dy∗i )/yi. After receiving the subsidy,
the agent with action i in population k obtains the following
payoff:
u˜k(ei, y) = uk(ei, y) + d fi(y).
The function fi : ¯∆→R is defined as follows:
fi(y) =

y∗i
yi
(
y∗i > 0
)
,
0
(
y∗i = 0
)
,
where
¯∆ =
{
y∈∆ | y∗i > 0 ⇒ yi > 0
}
.
The average payoff in population k is given by∑
i∈S
xki u˜
k(ei, y) =
∑
i∈S
xki
(
uk(ei, y) + d fi(y)
)
= uk(xk, y) + d

∑
i∈S
fi(y)xki
 .
By substituting u˜k(ei, y) and ∑i∈S xki u˜k(ei, y) for uk(ei, y) and
uk(xk, y) in Eq. (1), respectively, the replicator dynamics with
the subsidies is given by
x˙ki =
{
uk(ei, y) − uk(xk, y)
}
xki + dxki
 fi(y) −
∑
j∈S
f j(y)xkj
 . (2)
Equation (2) is invariant under any local shift of the payoff
matrix Ak for all k∈P, since the first term of Eq. (2) is the
same as the right hand side of Eq. (1), and the second term
is independent of the payoff function uk.
We suppose that x(0)∈int(∆m), where x(0) is an initial
population state combination. From the definition of fi(y),
the domain of Eq. (2) is ¯∆m, where
¯∆
m
=
{
x∈∆m | y∗i > 0 ⇒
∑
k∈P
vk xki > 0
}
.
We define amax, amin, Mi, and ∆mǫ as follows:
amax = max
i∈S , j∈S ,k∈P
{
aki j
}
,
amin = min
i∈S , j∈S ,k∈P
{
aki j
}
,
Mi =
d
amax − amin + d
y∗i ≤ y
∗
i ,
∆
m
ǫ =
{
x∈∆m | y∗i > 0 ⇒
∑
k∈P
vk xki ≥ ǫ
}
.
Then, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1: If d > 0, then, for any i∈C(y∗), there exists
Mi > 0 such that y˙i > 0 for all yi < Mi.
See Appendix A-2 for a proof of Lemma1. From Lemma
1, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2: If 0 < ǫ < mini∈C(y∗)Mi, then ∆mǫ is
compact and invariant in Eq. (2).
See Appendix A-3 for a proof of Proposition 2. From
Proposition 2, if x(0)∈int(∆m), then we can choose a suffi-
ciently small ǫ < mini∈C(y∗)Mi, which satisfies x(t)∈∆mǫ for
all t∈[0,∞).
We define ˆX, ¯X, and X∗ as follows:
ˆX =
{
x∈ ¯∆m |
{
uk(ei, y) − uk(xk, y)
}
xki = 0 ∀i∈S ∀k∈P
}
,
¯X =
{
x∈ ¯∆m |
∑
k∈P
vk xki = y
∗
i
∀i∈S
}
,
X∗ = ˆX∩ ¯X.
ˆX is a set of equilibrium points of Eq. (1), and ¯X is a set
of population state combinations corresponding to y∗. If y =
y∗ holds, then the second term of Eq. (2) is equal to zero.
Therefore, the following proposition can be easily shown:
Proposition 3: x∗∈X∗ is an equilibrium point of Eq. (2)
for all d > 0.
From Proposition 3, the government chooses a target
output y∗, and stabilizes the corresponding target equilibrium
point x∗∈X∗ by offering the subsidies. In the following, we
assume that there exists at least one element in X∗ which
satisfies y∗i =
∑
k∈Pv
k xk∗i for all i∈S .
IV. Global stabilization
A. Global stabilization condition
We derive a sufficient condition for x∗ to be a globally
asymptotically stable equilibrium point.
Theorem 1: We define two functions, ¯d : ¯∆m\ ¯X→R and
F1 : ¯∆m→R, as follows:
¯d(x) = −
∑
k∈P
vk
{
uk(xk∗, y) − uk(xk, y)
}
∑
j∈S
(y∗j − y j)
y∗j
y j
,
F1(x) =
∑
k∈P
vk
{
uk
(
xk∗, y
)
− uk
(
xk, y
)}
.
If X∗ = {x∗} , F1(x) ≥ 0 for all x∈ ¯X, and d >
max
{
0, supx∈ ¯∆m\ ¯X ¯d(x)
}
, then x∗ is a globally asymptotically
stable equilibrium point.
(Proof of Theorem 1)
Consider the following Lyapunov function candidate:
V(x) =
∑
k∈P
∑
i∈C(xk∗ )
−vkxk∗i log x
k
i
xk∗i
 .
V(x) > 0 holds for all x∈ ¯∆m\{x∗} and V(x) = 0 holds if and
only if x = x∗. The time derivative of V(x) along solutions
of Eq. (2) is
˙V(x) = −
∑
k∈P
∑
i∈C(xk∗)
xk∗i
xki
vk x˙ki
= −F1(x) − dF2(x),
where
F2(x) =
∑
i∈C(y∗)
(
y∗i − yi
) y∗i
yi
.
We define E as follows:
E =
{
x∈ ¯∆m | ˙V(x) = 0
}
.
We consider the case that 0 < ǫ < mini∈C(y∗)Mi and
x∈ ¯∆m\∆mǫ . Then, from Lemma 1, y˙i > 0 holds. Therefore,
no equilibrium points exist in ¯∆m\∆mǫ . Moreover, if y∗i > 0
and yi < Mi, then
x˙ki ≥
{
uk(ei, y) − uk(xk, y)
}
xki + dxki
{
y∗i
yi
− 1
}
> (amin − amax) xki + d
xki
Mi
y∗i − dxki
= (amin − amax) xki + (amax − amin + d) xki − dxki
= 0.
Therefore, we have ˙V(x) < 0 for all x∈ ¯∆m\∆mǫ , and E is
rewritten as follows:
E =
{
x∈∆mǫ |
˙V(x) = 0
}
= E1∪E2,
where
E1 =
{
x∈ ¯X | ˙V(x) = 0
}
,
E2 =
{
x∈∆mǫ \ ¯X | ˙V(x) = 0
}
.
First, we consider the case that x∈ ¯X. Obviously, we have∑
k∈Pv
k xki = y = y
∗
, and from the assumption, ˙V(x) =
−F1(x) ≤ 0 holds. Moreover, we have
E1 =
x∈ ¯X |
∑
k∈P
vk
{
uk
(
xk∗, y∗
)
− uk
(
xk, y∗
)}
= 0
 .
The largest invariant set in E1 is X∗∩E1 since the largest
invariant set in ¯X is X∗. We prove that X∗∩E1 = X∗. From
the definition of ˆX, for all x∗∈ ˆX,{
uk(ei, y∗) − uk(xk∗, y∗)
}
xk∗i = 0,
holds for all k∈P and all i∈S . Then, for all k∈P and all
i∈C(xk∗), uk(ei, y∗) = uk(xk∗, y∗) holds. Therefore, for all
x∈ ¯∆m and all k∈P,
C(xk)⊂C(xk∗) ⇒ uk(xk∗, y∗) − uk(xk, y∗) = 0. (3)
From the definition of X∗, for all x∈X∗, all k∈P, and all
i∈C(xk), uk(ei, y∗) = uk(xk, y∗) holds. Therefore, for all x∈X∗
and all k∈P,
C(xk∗)⊂C(xk) ⇒ uk(xk∗, y∗) − uk(xk, y∗) = 0. (4)
From Eqs. (3) and (4), x∈E1 holds for all x∈X∗. Therefore,
for all x∈ ¯X,
X∗∩E1 = X∗ and ˙V(x) ≤ 0. (5)
Next, we consider the case that x∈∆mǫ \ ¯X. Then, we have
F2(x) =
∑
i∈C(y∗)
(
y∗i
)2
yi
− 1.
From Jensen’s inequality,
−log

∑
i∈C(y∗)
(
y∗i
)2
yi
 ≤
∑
i∈C(y∗)
y∗i
(
−log
y∗i
yi
)
≤ log

∑
i∈C(y∗)
y∗i
yi
y∗i

≤ log

∑
i∈S
yi

= log(1) = 0.
Then, we have
∑
i∈C(y∗)
(
y∗i
)2
yi
≥ 1,
since log(yi) is a monotonically increasing function with
respect to yi. Thus, F2(x) = 0 holds if and only if y = y∗,
and if x∈∆mǫ \ ¯X, then F2(x) > 0 holds. Therefore, we have
E2 =
{
x∈∆mǫ \ ¯X | d = −
F1(x)
F2(x)
}
.
Therefore, for all x∈∆mǫ \ ¯X,
d > max
0, sup
x′∈∆mǫ \ ¯X
−
F1(x′)
F2(x′)
 ⇒ E2 = ∅ and ˙V(x) < 0. (6)

Fig. 4. Phase portrait for d = 0.
From Eqs. (5), (6), and LaSalle’s invariance principle
[11], if X∗ = {x∗}, F1(x) ≥ 0 for all x∈ ¯X, and d >
max
{
0, supx∈∆mǫ \ ¯X −
F1 (x)
F2 (x)
}
, then x∗ is a globally asymptoti-
cally stable equilibrium point. ✷
In Ref. [10], we derived a global stabilization condition
for m = 2 and n = 2 case. In this paper, we extend the
condition to m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2 case.
In the case that there exists more than one element in the
set X∗, we cannot apply Theorem 1. So, it is future work to
extend Theorem 1 to this case.
B. Example
We consider a 3-population and 2-action case. In this case,
we can eliminate xk2 since x
k
1 + x
k
2 = 1 for all k∈P = {1, 2, 3}.
Thus, we select x =
(
x11, x
2
1, x
3
1
)T
as a state vector of the
example. We suppose x(0)∈int(∆m). We set A1, A2, A3, v1, v2,
and v3 as follows:
A1 =
[
2 1
3 4
]
, A2 =
[
3 1
2 4
]
, A3 =
[
3 4
1 2
]
,
v1 = 0.2, v2 = 0.3, and v3 = 0.5.
In this case, from Eq. (1), if d = 0, then x =
(0, 0, 1)T and x = (0, 1, 1)T are asymptotically stable
equilibrium points. Shown in Fig. 4 is a phase portrait
for d = 0. In this example, we set five initial state
combinations: x(0) = (0.01, 0.01, 0.01)T, (0.01, 0.99, 0.01)T,
(0.99, 0.01, 0.01)T, (0.99, 0.99, 0.01)T, and (0.5, 0.5, 0.01)T.
From Fig. 4, depending on the initial states, their trajectories
converge to one of the stable equilibrium points.
First, we consider the case that y∗ = (1, 0)T is a target
output on the boundary of the output space ∆. Then, we have
X∗ =
{
(1, 1, 1)T
}
and the corresponding target equilibrium
point is x∗ = (1, 1, 1)T . It is easily shown that supx∈ ¯∆m\ ¯X ¯d(x) <
1.2 and F1(x) > 0 for all x∈ ¯X. Therefore, from Theorem
1, if d = 1.2, then x∗ is a globally asymptotically stable
equilibrium point.
Next, we consider the case that y∗ = (0.8, 0.2)T is a target
output in the interior of the output space ∆. Then, we have
X∗ =
{
(0, 1, 1)T
}
and the corresponding target equilibrium


Fig. 5. Phase portrait for d = 1.2 and y∗ = (1, 0)T .
point is x∗ = (0, 1, 1)T . It is easily shown that supx∈ ¯∆m\ ¯X ¯d(x) <
1.5 and F1(x) > 0 for all x∈ ¯X. Therefore, from Theorem
1, if d = 1.5, then x∗ is a globally asymptotically stable
equilibrium point.
Shown in Figs. 5 and 6 are phase portraits for y∗ = (1, 0)T
and y∗ = (0.8, 0.2)T , respectively. The trajectories converge
to x∗ = (1, 1, 1)T and x∗ = (0, 1, 1)T globally, respectively.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a government that controls
heterogeneous multiagent systems by using the subsidies,
and described their controlled dynamics by the replicator
dynamics. We also derived a global stabilization condition of
a target equilibrium point in the m-population and n-action
case (m ≥ 2, n ≥ 2).
Our future work is as follows:
• To derive a stabilization condition of a target output
in the case that there exist several equilibrium points
corresponding to the target output, or there exist no
equilibrium points corresponding to the target output;
• to discuss the robust stability of the target equilibrium
point against uncertainties of the payoff matrix Ak;
• to derive a stabilization condition of a target output
in the case that the government does not know the
population share vk or the payoff matrix Ak;
• to discuss the stabilization of the target equilibrium
point not by the subsidization but by the taxation; and
• to apply our research to the control of social infrastruc-
ture such as smart grid.
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Appendix A-1 : Proof of Proposition 1
Let ¯Ak be a payoff matrix where a constant b is added to
all elements of the column j of Ak. Let u¯k(s1, s2) = sT1 ¯Ak s2.
Then, u¯k(ei, y) and u¯k(xk, y) are given by
u¯k(ei, y) = eTi ¯Aky
= aki1y1 + . . . + (aki j + b)y j + . . . + akinyn
= uk(ei, y) + by j,
u¯k(xk, y) = (xk)T ¯Aky
=
∑
i∈S
xki e
T
i
¯Aky
=
∑
i∈S
xki u
k(ei, y) +
∑
i∈S
xki by j
= uk(xk, y) + by j.
Therefore, u¯k(ei, y)− u¯k(xk, y) = uk(ei, y)−uk(xk, y) holds. ✷
Appendix A-2 : Proof of Lemma 1
We define a function g j(w) : R→R as follows:
g j(w) =
y∗j
w
.
Then, f j(y) = g j
(
y j
)
= g j
(∑
k∈Pv
k xkj
)
holds. Thus, from
Jensen’s inequality,
g j

∑
k∈P
vk xkj
 ≤
∑
k∈P
vkg j
(
xkj
)
.
From Eq. (2), we have
x˙ki = {u
k(ei, y) − uk(xk, y)}xki + dxki

y∗i
yi
−
∑
j∈S
g j

∑
k∈P
vk xkj
 xkj

≥ {uk(ei, y) − uk(xk, y)}xki + dxki

y∗i
yi
−
∑
j∈S
∑
k∈P
vkg j
(
xkj
)
xkj

= {uk(ei, y) − uk(xk, y)}xki + dxki
{
y∗i
yi
− 1
}
.
Since y˙i =
∑
k∈Pv
k x˙ki , we have
y˙i ≥
∑
k∈P
vk{uk(ei, y) − uk(xk, y)}xki + dy∗i − dyi
≥ (amin − amax) yi + dy∗i − dyi
= (amin − amax − d) yi + dy∗i .
Thus, if yi < damax−amin+dy
∗
i = Mi, then y˙i > 0. Therefore, if
d > 0, then, for any i∈C(y∗), there exists Mi > 0 such that
y˙i > 0 for all x∈ ¯∆m with yi < Mi. ✷
Appendix A-3 : Proof of Proposition 2
Obviously, from the definition of ∆mǫ , if 0 < ǫ <
mini∈C(y∗)Mi, then ∆mǫ is compact.
Next, we prove that if 0 < ǫ < mini∈C(y∗)Mi, then ∆mǫ
is invariant in Eq. (2). Since ∆mǫ ⊂∆m, if x(0)∈∆mǫ , then∑
i∈S x
k
i (0) = 1 for all k∈P. From Eq. (2),
∑
i∈S x˙
k
i (t) = 0 for
all t∈[0,∞). Therefore,∑
i∈S
xki (t) = 1 ∀k∈P ∀t∈[0,∞). (7)
From Eq. (2), we have((
xki = 0
)
∨
(
xki = 1
))
⇒ x˙ki = 0. (8)
Moreover, from Lemma 1, if y∗i > 0 and
∑
k∈Pv
k xki = yi < Mi,
then y˙i > 0. Therefore, we have
yi(t) ≥ ǫ ∀ǫ < Mi ∀t∈[0,∞). (9)
From Eqs. (7), (8), and (9), if 0 < ǫ < mini∈C(y∗)Mi, then ∆mǫ
is invariant in Eq. (2). ✷
